如何判断合约是否已经缔结

如何判断合约是否已经缔结

詹先凯

在航运实务中，当事人双方，如果中间有经纪人的话，通过经纪人展开你争我夺的谈判，而谈判的形式也多种多样，电话电邮，国内也包括微信，国外或whatsapp及skype等，能用的都用上。这些沟通交流是否有法律效力呢？如之前那篇，合同签订前的谈判是否有法律效力一文可以看出，如果合同没有最终签订，属于 “Sub to Contract”这类型，即所有这些沟通交流还处在谈判中的话，那么当事人可以在任何时候从租约中撤退，而之前的任何谈判也不具有法律效力，除非合同已经用书面的形式确立下来。

回过头再来看看，Ackner勋爵的如下判词：

In my judgment, while negotiations are in existence either party is entitled to withdraw from those negotiations, at any time and for any reason. There can be thus no obligation to continue to negotiate until there is a “proper reason” to withdraw. Accordingly a bare agreement to negotiate has no legal content.

在该段陈词中，尤其是“In my judgment, while negotiations are in existence either party is entitled to withdraw from those negotiations, at any time and for any reason”这句，已经非常明确指出，当还在谈判的时候，任何一方在任何时候以任何理由都有权退出谈判。Ackner勋爵的这一观点也被其他法官及贵族院所接受。这是个对原则极不妥协的陈述，使得谈判的协议在实际中变得毫无用处；如果损害赔偿是根据另一方的期望或履行利益而进行的，作为任何违反合同签订前协议的损害赔偿将变得名存实亡。在该案中，Ackner勋爵的观点被Goff of Chieveley勋爵, Jauncey of Tullichettle勋爵及Browne-Wilkinson勋爵所接受，原告上诉被驳回。

在航运实践中，有时候，大部分合同条款或者几乎全部条款都已经谈好了，但是发货人还没有最终接受船舶，于是租家加了“Sub to shipper’s confirmaiton”或类似的“Sub to BOD”等；很多人认为此时合同已经成立，对船东已经有约束力，只有租家自己才有权利取消合同，而船东只能被动等待；除非租家同意，否则船东不得从租约中脱身，这些也被认为是对租家有利的条款。

近期在网上看到一段话：“根据英国法，合同是严格的，只有每一个细节都谈拢了，合同才算有效或立。如合同的细节没有谈拢，合同就没有成立。此外，英国法还强调，在谈定条款时，双方必须有受合同约束的意图。”。但事实情况是否真的这样？这些认知是否是正确的呢？笔者并不这样认为，当事人完全可以在合同缔结之后再来谈一些合同细节问题。那么合约已经缔结与否的评判标准又是什么？本文将通过对一些先例的介绍，来澄清这一问题。

首先来看Pagnan S.p.A. v. Feed Products Ltd案。

一、基本案情

原告Pagnan S.p.A.(以下简称“买家”) 是在帕多瓦开展业务的知名贸易商，被告Feed Products Ltd（以下简称“卖家”）是美国知名贸易集团的成员。买家与卖家通过Agrimec S.R.L公司的Pagnossin先生(以下简称“经纪”) 商谈一批玉米面筋饲料颗粒的买卖。

双方就货物的价格，运输条款和付款通过电报进行了商谈，在1982年2月1日，经纪向买卖双方发了电报，声明“The following business…concluded”,下列生意已经达成，然后列出了合同条款。

WE CONFIRM THE FOLLOWING BUSINESS TODAY CONCLUDED THROUGH OUR INTERMEDIARY:

SELLER:

MESSRS FEED PRODUCTS LIMITED-CHURCHILL-LAAN 11 3527 GV UTRECHT.-

BUYER:

MESSRS PAGNAN S.P.A.-GALLERIA BRANCALEONI: 2 35100 PADOVA-ITALIA

30.000.

-MTO. CORN GLUTEN FEED PELLETS, +/- 5 0/0 IN VESSEL’S OPTION AT CONTRACT PRICE-15 DAYS PROVISIONAL NOTICE FOR SHIPMENT AND QUANTITIES-5 DAYS DEFINITIVE.

10.000.

-MTO. +/- 5 PCT EACH SHIPMENT MAY/JUNE/JULY 1982

PRICE:

US DOLL 158.50 PER 1.000 KOS FOB STOWED AND TRIMMED 1 SAFE BERTH ONE US GULF PORT

PAYMENT:

CAD NY

QUALITY:

23/24 PCT PROTEIN AND FAT COMBINED, MAX 11 PCT FIBER, BASIS 12 PCT MOISTURE-ALLOWANCES 1:1-QUALITY AND CONDITION FINAL AT LOADING AS PER INDEPENDENT LABORATORY CERTIFICATE.

SHIPMENT:

PER BULK CARRIER-TANKER EXCLUDED

CONTRACT:

GAFTA 119 IN ADDITION NAEGA 2 REVISED.

THANKS AND REGARD

2月2日，卖家的供应商ADM向卖方发出电报，列出一系列长期合同条款。卖家对电传进行了一定的修改，并将其发送给买家。2月3日的买家告之经纪不能接受其中的某些条款。发了如下电传：

CTR 1/2/82

mt 30.000 u.s. corn gluten feed pellets sellers: feed products ltd.

with ref to your tlx 2/2 18 07 hrs we point out the following to you:

1) the 5 pct m/l vessel’s option is to be reckoned at ctr price as agreed.

2) quality condition to be exactly formulated as follows:

– 23/24 pct protein and fat combined

– max 11 pct fiber

– basis 12 pct moisture with non-reciprocal allowance of 1:1 quality and condition final at port of loading in accordance with official n.s.p.a. independent laboratory certificate.

3) payment in new york (not minneapolis) as agreed.

4) c/c condition must state precisely: “no carrying charges if vessel files within shipment period otherwise buyers to pay c/c etc. etc. . . . “

5) loading condition to provide for a loading rate of 2500 m/t (i/o s/t) and to contain a reference to saturday baltimore form c clause.

this for good order’s sake.

随后双方又多次电报往来，2月8日，经纪和卖家认为买卖双方唯一的差异点已经被整理出来。

2月26日卖方收到ADM正式的买卖合同。然后卖家准备正式的出售文件给买家。该文件反映了与ADM达成一致的条款，但没有反映与买方同意的变更。该文件交给经纪，经纪在3月9日转交给买家。

3月10日，买家发电传给卖家，说明合同的起草是以不正确的方式进行的，或者是以特定的或明确的谈判的形式处理的。

此后用电传进行了交流，但最终买家声称之间并未签订有约束力的合同。

二、争议焦点

争议的焦点问题归纳起来有以下几点：

（1）Was a binding contract made on Feb 1? (2月1日是否签订了具有​​约束力的合同？)

（2）Was the contract of Feb.1 (if there was one ) rescinded by

mutualagreement? (如果是的话，是否被双方同意解除？)

（3）If no contact was made on Feb.1 was a contact made on the 8^th? (如果在2月1日没有签订合同，那么是否在2月8日签订？)

首先，关于法律问题，Bingham法官认为，本案中所运用的一般原则并没有太大疑问。法院的任务是审查推断当事人的那些言行，并从材料各方所表达彼此目标的意图来判断双方是否已经达成都具有约束力的合同

The general principles to be applied in deciding the issue in this case are not, I think, open to much doubt. The Court’s task is to review what the parties said and did and from that material to infer whether the parties’ objective intentions as expressed to each other were to enter into a mutually binding contract.

如Denning勋爵在Storer v. Manchester City Council, [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1403案中所说，在合同中，你不会考虑一个人的真实意图。你看他说什么，做什么。当合同出现在外面时，合同就形成了。如果用他这样的话来说，一个人不可能说出“我不打算签约”。他的意图只能在他的信件所表达的外在表达中找到。他们展示了一已签的合同，这就够了。

In contracts you do not look into the actual intent in a man’s mind. You look at what he said and did. A contract is formed when there is, to all outward appearances, a contract. A man cannot get out of a contract by saying “I did not intend to contract” if by his words he has done so. His intention is to be found only in the outward expression which his letters convey. It they show a concluded contract, that is enough.

Bingham法官认为，更清楚的是，如果各方之间的交流持续一段时间，法院必须考虑所有这些交换，而不是单独采取一个情节，以便得出合同已经形成。在某些情况下，据称在合同之后继续进行谈判会导致推断，双方从来没有真正打算对他们有约束力，如Hussey v. Horne-Payne案。

It is furthermore clear that where exchanges between parties have continued over a period the Court must consider all these exchanges in context and not seize upon one episode in isolation in order to conclude that a contract has been made. There will be some cases where continued negotiations after a contract has allegedly been made will lead to the inference that the parties never in truth intended to bind themselves, as in Hussey v. Horne-Payne, (1879) L.R. 4 App. Cas. 311.

Bingham法官认为，如果各方对他们认为对具有约束力的协议至关重要的条款没有达成一致意见，那么自然而然地就是，只有当他们同意这些条款时，才能达成具有约束力的协议。参Rossiter v. Miller, (1878)案。

Where the parties have not reached agreement on terms which they regard as essential to a binding agreement, it naturally follows that there can be no binding agreement until they do agree on those terms: see Rossiter v. Miller, (1878) 3 App. Cas. 1124 at p. 1151 per Lord Blackburn.

但是，正如各方通过言语和行为向各方自由敞开的，以表明在约定某些条款之前他们不打算有束缚力，即使这些条款（客观地看）的意义相对较小，反之也是如此。当事人可以用自己的言行来清晰表明，他们有意约束，即使还有其他条款尚未达成一致，即使是在签订有约束力的合同之前经常或通常会达成一致的条款。参Love and Stewart 案。

But just as it is open to parties by their words and conduct to make clear that they do not intend to be bound until certain terms are agreed, even if those terms (objectively viewed) are of relatively minor significance, the converse is also true. The parties may by their words and conduct make it clear that they do intend to be bound, even though there are other terms yet to be agreed, even terms which may often or usually be agreed before a binding contract is made: see Love and Stewart, sup., per Lord Loreburn L.C. at p. 476.

Bingham法官认为虽然在信件中包含合同时，但应该查看全部交流，如果一旦有了确定的提议，并且没有资格就被接受了，而且要约和接受函似乎包含了所有的条款；双方达成一致意见后，所达成的完整合同不会受到后续谈判的影响。一旦证明有完整的合同，双方之间的进一步谈判就不能在未经双方同意的情况下摆脱已经达成的合同。当事人各方应被视为合同命运的主人，这是他们的重要意图，法院必须努力实现。

在考虑这个问题时，Bingham法官认为他不太喜欢在案文中分析询问是否有要约和接受，还是还价，等等。他更愿意审查案件中的所有文件，并从中决定各方是否在这种情况下就所有重要条款达成协议，以致从那时起，他们同意接受这些条款的约束。此外，他认为，法院必须时刻牢记正在处理的事项。无疑，合同法的相关原则是普遍适用的，但根据具体案件的事实，适当的推定可能会有很大的不同。一个案例可能涉及一个漫长的谈判，也许是以前没有任何交易的各方之间的书面通过律师进行的谈判。另一个可能涉及专业人士之间的一系列快速交流，他们都是同行业的从业者，既有过往的交往，又有广泛的共同经验，知识，语言和理解。人们不能以同样的方式明智地处理这些案件。推论一个案件可能是合适的，但另一个案例可能是不恰当的。但法院的任务基本上是一样的：辨认和落实当事人的客观意图。

关于第一个问题，2月1日是否签订了具有​​约束力的合同；Bingham法官认为，据他判断，有很强烈的迹象表明，各方打算在2月1日签订具有约束力的合同。卖方在获得供应来源之后，提出了一个可以接受的坚定要约。协议是就交易的基本条款达成一个简短的谈判：产品，价格，数量，装运期，装货港的范围和管理合同条款。买方要求反思的是一个处于边缘承诺的人的行为，而不是一个处于持续谈判中的人。他对经纪所下的业务的指示只与合同意图一致。经纪人的确认电传中使用的语言是任何交易者立即认可的合约语言。当时买方并没有抱怨经纪人给他一份他从未提出过的协议，他也没有说电报中的任何条款都尚未达成协议。任何一方都未以任何方式询问或质疑电传内容。

There are, in my judgment, very strong indications that the parties intended to and did make a binding contract on Feb. 1. The sellers, after securing a source of supply, made a firm offer capable of acceptance. Agreement was after a brief negotiation reached on the cardinal terms of the deal: product, price, quantity, period of shipment, range of loading ports and governing contract terms.

在转发ADM电报（稍作修改）时，卖家提到“昨天已达成下面的交易”，买家没有理会这种语言。相反，他们用一个电报来回答：

ctr 1/2/82 mt 30.000 u.s. corn gluten feed pellets sellers: feed products ltd.

Sellers: Feed Products Ltd.

…

Bingham法官认为，在他看来，电报机在2月8日到3月9日之间是不会有闲置的，因为如果没有一个坚定的信念，至少卖家和经纪人是这样认为已经签订了坚定的合同。当合同纠纷在适当的时候形成时，买方并不惊讶于收到有关早已失败的谈判的正式合同文件，而是不同意脱离经过具体谈判的条款，这是一个相当的初步的暗示。在收到法律意见后的4月7日的电报中，买家的语气不太现实，但信息是一样的。作为原告在这个诉讼中举证责任的买方正式承担了责任，提出了4月2日没有订立合同的四个理由，其中两个论点可以很快处理，Bingham法官认为他会先处理。

买方声称2月1日关于货量还没达成协议，所以没有订立合同。Bingham法官认为已经得出了明确的结论，就是货量已经达成了一致，这是最终定论。

买方声称2月1日的任何协议都是不确定的，因为在装货港口或任何装货港口范围内没有明确的或暗示的协议。在达成协议之前，有必要就这个问题达成协议；因此协议无效。Bingham法官认为，这个意见也是事实的奠基者。他很满意达成了协议。 诚然，没有明确的协议，哪一方可以选择在商定的范围内提名装货港，但是GAFTA 119包含了英格兰的法律，而英国的规则是这样的一个地方。合同，有一个商定的港口范围，然后初步证明没有明确的协议，没有任何特定的结论可以得出任何习俗或任何周边的情况下，选择装货港的是买方。

经过一系列争辩，但Bingham法官最终在这一点上，他并不支持买家的任何论点。他认为2月1日已经签订了合同。他不以这个结论作为举证责任。如果卖方作为原告承担了签订合同的责任，那么这是他的判决。

I do not therefore uphold any of the buyers’ arguments on this point. I hold that a contract was made on Feb. 1. I do not base this conclusion on the burden of proof. It is a conclusion I would reach if the sellers, as plaintiffs, had assumed the burden of establishing a contract.

对于第二个问题，Bingham法官认为如果与其主要意见相反，在2月1日签订了合同，买方请求法院认定双方同意并且在2月2日至8日之间通过谈判的详细条款撤销了合同。Bingham法官认为他不会因为买家没有热情地推进它，而且确实把它形容为不现实而纠结这个问题。法院的任务是解释在此期间双方之间的书面和口头交流，并决定双方是否在不妨碍已经达成的协议的情况下进行谈判。只有一个答案是可能的。任何一方都没有明确或暗示地建议取消现有的合同。相反，双方通过参照2月1日的电报合同，买方坚持遵守已经达成的条款，明确表示肯定。因此买家的这个主张不成立。

对于第三个问题，买方争辩说，就像2月1日没有签订合同一样，所以2月8日也没有。他们的分析，假设在1日缺乏共识，是这样的。卖方2月2日的长电传是从ADM处收到的电传（稍作修改），是一个要约。买家2月3日的回应并不接受所有卖家的条款，因此是还价。如果买方没有及时回应这个还价，买方就会接受这个还价的时间限制。在限期内没有接受，所以还价失效。当卖方确实在时限外作出回应时，他们的电传是一个进一步的还价，因为它提出了一个新的货量及容忍价格的条款，并没有包含买家提出的条款（装率为公吨），并将星期六条款列入Baltimore的表格C.

买方声称从未接受卖方提出的关于货量容差的妥协方案，卖方从未接受过Baltimore 表格C的承诺。在装载率方面也从来没有达成一致。

卖方认为，如果与第一种情况相反，2月1日没有订立合同，那么2月8日合同已缔结；因为所有未确定的条款都已经同意了。

Bingham法官认为，根据他已经表达和已经表达的看法，这个问题没有出现，但是他应该简要地陈述他的结论。正如他所发现的那样，卖方确实承认装货率应该是吨，而这个接受度是在8号口头传达给买家的。他不认为Baltimore 的表格C会出现分歧，因为卖方在2月2日提议时间应按照Baltimore的表格C来计算。买方已经接受了这个建议，其中包括星期六条款和卖家从来没有撤回他们的建议。所以他不认为这是一个差异点。但是，接受当事人对所有具体条款达成一致的假设是缔结合同的先决条件的假设，他并不认为达成了关于货量宽容定价的协议。5日提出的卖方期限是新的，不是接受，在买方截止日期之前没有收到。在“noting”这个电报的情况下，买家不能被接受，他不认为在8号电话交谈中，买家对这个词的反对是不能被接受的。因此，这个假设并没有因此而在2月8日双方达成共识。

然而，Bingham法官认为这个假设是错误的，如果各方不是谈判条款，那么协议的前提是合同的前提条件，在签订合同时，这些交易的观点是完全不同的。在其真实的背景下，买方注意到卖方提出的对货量容差进行定价的妥协方案，并且对其没有任何异议，他认为这些是被接受的。

I have, however, reached the conclusion that the hypothesis is a false one, and if (as I think) the parties were not negotiating terms, agreement of which was to be a pre-condition of contract, but sorting out details against the background of a concluded contract, these exchanges take on a very different colour. In its true context the buyers noting of the sellers’ compromise proposal for pricing the quantity tolerance and their lack of any objection to it is in my view to be regarded as acceptance of it.

Bingham法官最终判合同在2月1日已经缔结；买方不服判决，上诉。

三、上诉院法官判决

上诉院的Lloyd勋爵认为，被告提交的这些事实以及法官认为2月1日已经有一份具有约束力的合同。原告的代表律师Rokison反驳了这一裁决。他提出了两个主要的论点：第一，2月1日没有达成协议，因为双方尚未同意一些重要的条款，包括装载率，滞期费率和运费率和运费费用的开始日期。 Rokison认为，正确的推论是双方在这些事情达成一致之前不打算有约束力。

第二个论点是，2月1日双方并未同意，因为经纪在电话中接受的条款包括买方自己提出的两个条款，但没有任何被告的授权。

Lloyd勋爵认为他可以直接处理第二个论点。这是，如果他可以这样说，没有法律依据的任何痕迹。Bingham法官认为，虽然，因为他发现，这两个附加条款，提出了没有授权，但授权的是想通过事后追认。 Rokison提出的是，从授权经纪人的行为，到目前为止，卖方延误了一天，然后提出这是与买方同意条款不一致的说法。Lloyd勋爵认为考虑通过单一中介机构谈判的合同时，他认为在权威性和授权性方面，甚至提供和还价方面，他觉得是没有帮助的。 在这种情况下，唯一的问题就是中介是否得到了双方的同意。那一刻是2月1日星期一，当时经纪在与买家同一天早些时候的谈话之后回应了卖家。Lloyd勋爵认为当他看到法官的判决时，他接受了经纪人的证据，表示卖家在经纪寄出他那天的电报之前同意了这两个附加条款。

Lloyd勋爵认为，正如法官在判决结束时发现的那样，原告最终因他们没有反对来接受这种更改。但这一切都没有影响到法官明确指出的事实：买家有意识地决定接受经纪人提出的附加条款。Lloyd勋爵认为有足够的证据支持这一认定。 因此，他会拒绝Rokison关于2月1日双方不合理的论点。经纪与买家的谈话结束时，他们可能并不认同，但是他们在结论上显然是令人满意的；随后当天晚些时候与卖家继续交谈。

至于被告人在事件中成功的企图改变其中一项附加条款，毫无疑问，这种解释显然是商业性的。卖家急于确保被告与原告的合同应该到目前为止，尽可能与被告与供应商的合同背靠背。

Lloyd勋爵认为如果违背他的观点，更好的办法是以权威性和批准性来审议这个案子，但有充分的证据支持法官认定卖家授权经纪的行为，如已经提到过2月1日在电话交谈过程中提出两个附加条件。根据这一观点，当事方可以根据这一观点，在经纪与买家的谈话结束时，而不是在几分钟或几小时之后，在经纪与卖家的谈话之后，才作出上述建议；但这两种方法都没有实际的区别。

现在回到卖家代理律师Rokison的第一及主要论点。他指出，隔离地看经纪在2月1日的电传这是错误的。电传中可能会出现记录得出已有合同的结论，但是当你看看上下文它需要在不同的方面。虽然各方都放在最重要的方面，如价格，货量和交货日期，仍有待商定的其他重要方面。唯一正确的推理，Rokison说，是各方仍在谈判，并没有打算对彼此有约束力，直到谈判结束。

买家律师Rokison为了支撑他的观点，他向法院提及了4个贵族院的判决。Lloyd勋爵他按时间先后顺序予以分析。

第一个是在Ridgway v. Wharton(1856) 6 H.L. Cas. 238.案中，Wensleydale法官所说的：

. . . An agreement to be finally settled must comprise all the terms which the parties intend to introduce into the agreement. An agreement to enter into an agreement upon terms to be afterwards settled between the parties is a contradiction in terms. It is absurd to say that a man enters into an agreement till the terms of that agreement are settled. Until those terms are settled he is perfectly at liberty to retire from the bargain. Now, in this case, it is clear that from the first this was not an agreement for a lease, which lease, according to the state of the law at that time, must have been a lease by deed, but merely an agreement to enter into an agreement to be afterwards drawn up by a solicitor. Then that comes to a pure question of facts, whether the parties intended that the agreement to be so drawn up should embody what they agreed upon, and that they should not be bound till the formal agreement is entered into, or whether they meant to agree by parol, but agreeing upon all the terms first, they meant afterwards to reduce it into writing as a memorial.

最终定下来的协议必须包括双方有意引入协议的所有条款。就双方之后达成的条件达成协议是一个矛盾的问题。说一个人在协议条款解决之前达成协议是荒谬的。在这些条件解决之前，他完全可以自由退出谈判。现在，在这种情况下，很显然，从第一个来看，这不是一个租约的协议，根据当时的法律，租赁契约一定是契约，而只是一个进入契约变成一个律师事后拟定的协议。那么这是一个纯粹的事实问题，各方是否打算这样制定的协议应该体现他们所同意的内容，直到正式协议达成为止，或者是否由parol同意，但首先同意所有的条款，他们之后的意思是降低它作为一个纪念性文字。

Rokison先生依靠特别是在该段的第一和最后一个句子，如果合同具有约束力，则必须就双方意图引入协议的所有条款达成一致。

第二个是在Rossiter v. Miller, (1878) 3 App.Cas. 1124案中，Blackburn勋爵所说：

I quite agree with the Lords Justices that . . . it is a necessary part of the Plaintiff’s case to shew that the two parties had come to a final and complete agreement, for, if not, there was no contract. So long as they are only in negotiation either party may retract; and though the parties may have agreed on all the cardinal points of the intended contract, yet, if some particulars essential to the agreement still remain to be settled afterwards, there is no contract. The parties, in such a case, are still only in negotiation.

我很同意上议院大法官的意见。原告案件的一个必要部分就是双方已经达成最终完整的协议，否则就没有合同。只要他们在谈判，任何一方都可以撤回；尽管双方可能已经就拟定合同的所有基本点达成一致，但是，如果协议的某些细节仍然有待于解决，那么就没有合同。在这种情况下，各方仍然只是在谈判。

第三个是Hussey v. Horne-Payne, (1879) 4 App. Cas. 311案，Cairns法官所说的如下陈词，该案可能是这个领域最著名的权威，经常被援引。

. . . it is one of the first principles applicable to a case of the kind that where you have to find your contract, or your note or memorandum of the terms of the contract in letters, you must take into consideration the whole of the correspondence which has passed. You must not at one particular time draw a line and say, “We will look at the letters up to this point and find in them a contract or not, but we will look at nothing beyond.” In order fairly to estimate what was arranged and agreed, if anything was agreed between the parties, you must look at the whole of that which took place and passed between them.

这是适用于这种情况的首要原则之一，当你在信件中必须签订你的合同，或者你的信件或合同条款的备忘录，你必须考虑到过往的全部通信往来。你不可以在某个特定的时间划上一条界限，说：“我们将看到这些信件，并在其中找到合同，但是我们不会看到任何东西。” 为了公平地估计什么是已安排和同意的，如任何事双方已达成一致，你必须看看他们之间过往所发生的一切。

买家律师Rokison因此主张，依靠这段话，如果谈判如同在这里一样没有中断地继续下去，那么通常的规则就是在谈判完成之前你不能划清界限。

第四个是，Love and Stewart v. Instone, (1917) 33 T.L.R. 475.案。

贵族院判没有缔结合同。Lloyd勋爵认为他不需要考虑这个案子的事实，但是与目前的情况有如此的相似之处：其中一方在谈判过程中写了一封确认合同的信。Parker勋爵，及Shaw勋爵和Sumner勋爵都不认为这是合同已缔结的结论，或者实际上似乎认为这是一个重要的因素。Sumner勋爵说，他不明白当这个陈述本身是一个错误时，现在是否有合同可以提供帮助。他认为，真正的意思是很清楚的，即谈判已经被证实。

最后，买家的代表律师Rokison提及了Pagnan v. Granaria案，该案也是经纪人发了一份确认的电传，如本案的情况。Lloyd勋爵认为，John Donaldson法官在那案中所说的，恰当的概述了Rokison的辩解。

In all the circumstances, it seems to me that there was ample scope for misunderstanding. It was a complicated deal. It was not a case of selling just one product; it involved selling two products and integrating the two contracts. In those circumstances, I have reached the unhesitating conclusion that the so-called confirmatory telexes were in fact part of the negotiation and could better have been headed “Clean copy of where we have got to so far,” and it seems to me that they were so treated by the parties.

在所有情况下，在我看来，有很大的误解余地。这是一个复杂的交易。这不是销售一种产品的情况，涉及销售两种产品并整合这两个合同。在这种情况下，我得出了这样一个无疑的结论：所谓确认性电报实际上是谈判的一部分，最好是以“Clean copy of where we have got to so far”为标题。在我看来，他们 受到了当事人的如此的对待。

也就是说，他们只把那份确认性的电传当作了谈判的一部分，因此合同并未缔结。

在驳回Rokison的论点之前，Lloyd勋爵认为他应该提到另外一点。Rokison他竭尽全力地表明，在这种情况下，为了使合同能够正常工作，对于装载率，滞期费等剩余点的协议是不可或缺的。他承认，这些方面的任何差距都可能是由法律的暗示所填补的。但他主张，那不是双方的意图。他们打算就这些事情彼此达成一致。因此，在这样做之前，并没有约束力的合同。

Lloyd勋爵他回过头来看看法官如何处理这个问题。法官继续提到刚才提到的一点：

But, say the buyers, agreement on these points, even if not legally necessary, is so usual and of such economic significance to a buyer that the parties must have envisaged continuing negotiation and cannot have intended to commit themselves without such agreement. This is a substantial argument and raises what I regard as the crucial issue in this part of the case. I accept that these are terms of economic significance to buyers, and to these buyers. I accept that it is usual for parties to reach express agreement on them. I accept that on Feb. 1 the buyers and the sellers expected terms to be put forward for agreement, as they had been by Herr Winkelmann and very shortly were by ADM. I do not, however, accept that either party intended express agreement on these terms to be a precondition of any concluded agreement. I think the parties regarded these as relatively minor details which could be sorted out without difficulty once a bargain had been struck, as in the event they were. I have no reason to doubt that ADM and the sellers intended to bind themselves in advance of settling these terms, and when ADM did suggest detailed terms the sellers accepted them at once and without demur. Once the misunderstanding about short tons and metric tonnes had been resolved, the sellers and the buyers also were quickly able to agree. I do not think either party thought these points at all likely to give rise to disagreement, and I doubt if either gave any thought to the consequences if they disagreed. I conclude that this is a case in which the parties did mutually intend to bind themselves on the terms agreed on Feb. 1, leaving certain subsidiary and legally inessential terms to be settled later.

但是，如果买方说，就这些问题达成一致，即使没有法律上的必要性，对于买方来说也是如此，并且具有如此重要的经济意义，以至于各方必须设想继续谈判，而且如果没有这样的协议，就不可能有意承诺。这是一个实质性的论点，并提出我认为这个案件的关键问题。我接受这些对于买家和买家来说都具有经济意义。我同意各方通常会就此达成明确的协议。我同意，2月1日，买家和卖家希望提前达成协议的条款，就像Herr Winkerlmann所做的那样，不久之后又由ADM来做。但是，我并不认为任何一方希望就这些条款达成明确的协议，作为任何达成的协议的先决条件。我认为各方都把这些细节看作是相对较小的细节，一旦交易达成，就可以毫不费力地解决。我没有理由怀疑ADM和卖方是否打算在解决这些条款之前自我约束，当ADM确实提供了详细的条款时，卖家立即接受了这些条款，毫不犹豫。一旦对短吨和公吨的误解得到解决，卖方和买方也很快同意。我不认为任何一方都认为这些观点有可能引起分歧，我怀疑是否有不同意见后果。我认为这是一个双方互相打算以2月1日同意的条款约束自己的情况，留下了一些附属的和法律上的非必要条款。

为了便于首先考虑一下这位有渊博知识的法官所表达的观点是否是他有权采取法律的观点，其次是否他的结论在事实上是正当的。Lloyd勋爵认为，作为法律问题，如他之前所提到的，从权威中所获得的原则可以归纳如下：

(1) In order to determine whether a contract has been concluded in the course of correspondence, one must first look to the correspondence as a whole (see Hussey v. Horne-Payne).

为了确定在通信交往过程中合同是否已经缔结，首先要看整个通信往来，参Hussey v. Horne-Payne案。

(2) Even if the parties have reached agreement on all the terms of the proposed contract, nevertheless they may intend that the contract shall not become binding until some further condition has been fulfilled. That is the ordinary “subject to contract” case.

即使各方已经就拟议合同的所有条款达成一致，但他们可能打算在达成一些进一步的条件之前，合同不具有约束力。这是普通的“Sub to Contract”案件。

(3) Alternatively, they may intend that the contract shall not become binding until some further term or terms have been agreed; see Love and Stewart v. Instone, where the parties failed to agree the intended strike clause, and Hussey v. Horne-Payne, where Lord Selborne said at p. 323:

另外，他们可能打算在达成一些进一步的条款之前，合同不具有约束力。如Love and Stewart v. Instone案，当事方为能就意向的罢工条款达成一致；及Hussey v. Horne-Payne案，Selborne法官所说的如下：

. . . The observation has often been made, that a contract established by letters may sometimes bind parties who, when they wrote those letters, did not imagine that they were finally settling the terms of the agreement by which they were to be bound; and it appears to me that no such contract ought to be held established, even by letters which would otherwise be sufficient for the purpose, if it is clear, upon the facts, that there were other conditions of the intended contract, beyond and besides those expressed in the letters, which were still in a state of negotiation only, and without the settlement of which the parties had no idea of concluding any agreement. [My emphasis].

常常有人提出这样的观点，即以信件形式签订的合同有时可以约束各方，他们在写信的时候，并没有想象到他们终于解决了他们所约束的协议条款。在我看来，如果事实清楚地表明，除了所表达的意思之外，还有其他意向合同的其他条件，即使是通过其他方式足以达到目的的信件，也不应该建立这样的合同。在信中，这些信件还只处于谈判的状态。当事方尚未有缔结任何协议的解决方案。

(4) Conversely, the parties may intend to be bound forthwith even though there are further terms still to be agreed or some further formality to be fulfilled (see Love and Stewart v. Instone per Lord Loreburn at p. 476).

相反地，即使有进一步的条件尚待商定或进一步的手续需完成，双方可能打算立即受到约束。参Love and Stewart v. Instone案。

(5) If the parties fail to reach agreement on such further terms, the existing contract is not invalidated unless the failure to reach agreement on such further terms renders the contract as a whole unworkable or void for uncertainty.

如果双方未能就这样的进一步条款达成一致，那么现有的合同不会失效，除非未能就这些进一步的条款达成一致，会导致合同整体不可履行或者不确定。

(6) It is sometimes said that the parties must agree on the essential terms and that it is only matters of detail which can be left over. This may be misleading, since the word “essential” in that context is ambiguous. If by “essential” one means a term without which the contract cannot be enforced then the statement is true: the law cannot enforce an incomplete contract. If by “essential” one means a term which the parties have agreed to be essential for the formation of a binding contract, then the statement is tautologous. If by “essential” one means only a term which the Court regards as important as opposed to a term which the Court regards as less important or a matter of detail, the statement is untrue. It is for the parties to decide whether they wish to be bound and, if so, by what terms, whether important or unimportant. It is the parties who are, in the memorable phrase coined by the Judge, “the masters of their contractual fate”. Of course the more important the term is the less likely it is that the parties will have left it for future decision. But there is no legal obstacle which stands in the way of the parties agreeing to be bound now while deferring important matters to be agreed later. It happens every day when parties enter into so-called “heads of agreement”. Mr. Rokison submits that that is a special case, but I do not think it is.

有时会说，各方必须就基本条款达成一致，而这只是一个可以遗漏的细节问题。这可能是误导性的，因为在这方面“基本”一词是含糊不清的。如果用“基本”一词来表示一个没有合同的条款，那么这个陈述就是真实的：法律不能执行不完整的合同。如果“基本”一词是指双方同意对于形成具有约束力的合同至关重要的术语，那么这种说法就是同义词。如果说“基本的”，那么只是法院认为重要的一个术语，而不是法院认为不太重要或者细节问题的一个术语，这个陈述是不真实的。各方是否有意约束，如果是的话，是以什么条件，无论重要还是不重要。在法官创造的令人难忘的话语中，各方是“合同命运的主人”。当然，这个术语越重要，各方将来可能会留下来作为将来的决定的可能性越小。但是，现在没有任何妨碍双方同意约束的法律障碍，而迟迟不会商定重要的事项。这种情况每天都发生在各方进入所谓的主要协议时。买家的律师Rokison主张那是个特殊的案子，但Lloyd勋爵并不这样认为。

买家律师Rokison非常依赖这样的事实：法官描述了当事方尚未同意作为“对这些买方具有经济意义的条款”的条款。 但Lloyd勋爵认为如果他在他所说的主张，特别是观点（4）和（6）中是正确的，那么尚待商定的条款具有经济意义的事实并不妨碍合同即时生成，如果这是各方意图。所以法官的判决并没有存在法律错误。

If I am right in the propositions I have stated, and in particular propositions (4) and (6), the fact that the terms yet to be agreed were of economic significance would not prevent a contract coming into existence forthwith if that is what the parties intended. So I can find no error of law in the Judge’s approach.

法官是否有权对当事人的意图作出推论？法官所依据的事项载于第611段。 Lloyd勋爵认为他不必重复，仅仅罗列以下几个更重要的：

(1) Mr. Pagnan told Mr. Pagnossin on Feb. 1 to book the business.

(2) Mr. Pagnossin sent a confirmatory telex the same day referring to the business as -. . . having been concluded through our intermediary.

(3) Neither party raised any objection to the confirmatory telex.

(4) The plaintiffs thereafter headed their telexes “Contract 1/2/82”.

(5) There was no communication of any kind between Feb. 8, when the defendants agreed the loading rate, and Mar. 9, when Mr. Pagnossin despatched the documents.

(6) The plaintiffs did not then react as one would have expected if there had been no question of a binding contract.

买家的代表律师Rokison辩称，各方的反应与他们的想法毫不相干。Lloyd勋爵认为他当然同意，这个测试是客观的，各方的反应是不确定的。但他不能接受，他们是无关紧要的。关于法官所依赖的其他事项，Rokison提到的其中一些比较重要的事情是，法官给他们太多的分量。至于2月8日至3月9日的间隙，Rokison先生说可以有几个解释。选择一个而不是另一个只是猜测。

然而，Lloyd勋爵并不接受这些主张，法官认为这个问题如他前头已经提到的：非常强烈的迹象表明，各方打算并且在2月1日签署了具有约束力的合同。

…very strong indications that the parties intended to, and did, make a binding contract on Feb. 1.

Lloyd勋爵认为法官是对的。事实上，唯一的另一个迹象就是，双方在2月1日的确认电传之后继续进行谈判。但这根本不是一个意向。一旦接受了当事方在法律上有能力做出如Lloyd勋爵将称之为临时协议的内容，那么只能期待他们能够继续就延期条款进行谈判，这是他们所做的。Lloyd勋爵认为，法官就当事人的意图作出了正确的推论。

Lloyd勋爵他想补充一句，如果原告认为他们应该在Pagnan v. Granaria上诉法院成功但在本案中失败了，那么答案就在于这两起案件截然不同的事实。那是一个复杂的交易。 涉及销售两种产品并整合两个单独的合同。 这不是只销售一种产品的情况，但本案的情况是。因此，Lloyd勋爵认为导致不同的结果并不让人感到意外。

基于以上所给的理由，Lloyd勋爵驳回了买家上诉。Stocker勋爵同意，没有额外补充的；O’Connor勋爵也同意。

接下来再来简单看看其它判例。

1、Walford v.Miles案

在1987年3月12日，在原告的办公室，主要的买卖条款双方已经基本同意。在3月16日，原告发了一份传真给被告的律师，其抬头非常明确清晰地带有“Subject to contract”字样。但是最终买家却突然从谈判中跑了，而Ackner勋爵也作出了非同一般的判决，当合同还未成立，还在谈判的时候，任何一方在任何时候以任何理由都有权退出谈判。该案的具体情况可以参阅《合同签订前的谈判是否有法律效力》一文。

这里的“Subject to contract”,表明上的意思以合同为前提，实际上就是指以双方最终签订的合同文本作为合同缔结的前提条件。但如果没有签订最终的合同，那么之前的任何谈判将不具有法律效力，双方都可以在任何时间以任何理由自由地退出谈判，如前文提到的Ridgway v. Wharton(1856)案及Rossiter v. Miller, (1878)案。

2、The “Junior K”案

在该案中，简单的租船确认书如下：

Confirm telcons here recap fixture sub details

Vessel as described before as per our earlier recap (tc) 2 Oct acct Beogradska Plovidba Beograd

Min 6000 tons chopt up to full cargo of vessels capacity agprods stowed 55 cuft pmt

Laycan Spot/7 Oct (vsl could eta Mersin tomo pm)

1 sb Mersin aaaa/1 sb Bombay aaaa

650 tons per wwd shexeiu free in

Disch cop free out

Dem USD 2000 per hdwts loadport

Frt USD 180,000 lsum fio basis 6000 tons of cargo. Any additional cargo loaded to be settled at the rate of USD 25 pmt fio.

90 pct freight within 3 banking days of issuing and releasing bsl balance after right and true delivery latest within 7 days completion discharge.

Freight deemed earned on shipment discountless ship and or cargo lost or not lost

Taxes/dues and or fees on freight and vessel owners account

Taxes/dues and or fees on cargo including primage if any max 5 pct charterers account

For primage/freight tax calculations, authorities to be shown lumpsum freight as USD 120,000

Any overage premia chts account bs/l dated 30 Sept will be issued and delivered chasbe

3.75 pct

SUB DETS GENCON CP

当事人双方对于合同的主要条款都已经谈好，但是在开头及结尾加了“sub details”及“SUB DETS GENCON CP”。但是最终，租家以合同细节为谈妥，不履行合同。法官Steyn认为，“Sub details”在经纪业务中是一个众所周知的表达方式，如果任何一方真诚地对任何一方不满意他们之间讨论的任何细节，都有权让任何一方退出合同。

“Subject details” is a well-known expression in broking practice which is intended to entitle either party to resile from the contract if in good faith either party is not satisfied with any of the details as discussed between them.

法官Steyn认为解决这个问题的正确方法是询问一个精通租船业务的理性人如何解释这些话。他谨恭敬地提出，法院应该承认著名“Subject to contract”的海事变体的效力，这符合租船业务的利益。“Subject to details”这一表述使船东和租家能够知道他们在谈判的地方，并相应地管理他们的业务。这是一个趋于避免航运贸易中的争端和假设的手段，在这个阶段没有约束力的协议应该得到尊重是有效的。最终，Steyn法官判在本案中合同并未缔结，原告（船东）没有胜诉的前景。

And, I would respectfully suggest, that it is in the interests of the chartering business that the Courts should recognise the efficacy of the maritime variant of the well-known “subject to contract”. The expression “subject to details” enables owners and charterers to know where they are in negotiations and to regulate their business accordingly. It is a device which tends to avoid disputes and the assumption of those in the shipping trade that it is effective to make clear that there is no binding agreement at that stage ought to be respected.

My conclusion is, therefore, that no contract was concluded in this case. That does not, however, conclude the matter.

I conclude, therefore, that the plaintiffs have no realistic prospects of success. The application must succeed, and the order previously granted and service pursuant thereto must be set aside.

总结：

在本案中，基于买家对于经纪人在2月1日所发的抬头为“WE CONFIRM THE FOLLOWING BUSINESS TODAY CONCLUDED THROUGH OUR INTERMEDIARY”的电传未作保留，且在随后的交流谈判过程中，电传仍以CTR1/2/82抬头作了一系列回应。Lloyd勋爵认同Bingham法官的观点，非常强烈的迹象表明，各方打算并且在2月1日签署了具有约束力的合同。

Lloyd勋爵在先例权威的基础上，归纳总结了以下6条。鉴于其权威性，因此重复如下。

(1) In order to determine whether a contract has been concluded in the course of correspondence, one must first look to the correspondence as a whole (see Hussey v. Horne-Payne).

(2) Even if the parties have reached agreement on all the terms of the proposed contract, nevertheless they may intend that the contract shall not become binding until some further condition has been fulfilled. That is the ordinary “subject to contract” case.

(3) Alternatively, they may intend that the contract shall not become binding until some further term or terms have been agreed; see Love and Stewart v. Instone, where the parties failed to agree the intended strike clause, and Hussey v. Horne-Payne, where Lord Selborne said at p. 323:

. . . The observation has often been made, that a contract established by letters may sometimes bind parties who, when they wrote those letters, did not imagine that they were finally settling the terms of the agreement by which they were to be bound; and it appears to me that no such contract ought to be held established, even by letters which would otherwise be sufficient for the purpose, if it is clear, upon the facts, that there were other conditions of the intended contract, beyond and besides those expressed in the letters, which were still in a state of negotiation only, and without the settlement of which the parties had no idea of concluding any agreement. [My emphasis].

(4) Conversely, the parties may intend to be bound forthwith even though there are further terms still to be agreed or some further formality to be fulfilled (see Love and Stewart v. Instone per Lord Loreburn at p. 476).

(5) If the parties fail to reach agreement on such further terms, the existing contract is not invalidated unless the failure to reach agreement on such further terms renders the contract as a whole unworkable or void for uncertainty.

(6) It is sometimes said that the parties must agree on the essential terms and that it is only matters of detail which can be left over. This may be misleading, since the word “essential” in that context is ambiguous. If by “essential” one means a term without which the contract cannot be enforced then the statement is true: the law cannot enforce an incomplete contract. If by “essential” one means a term which the parties have agreed to be essential for the formation of a binding contract, then the statement is tautologous. If by “essential” one means only a term which the Court regards as important as opposed to a term which the Court regards as less important or a matter of detail, the statement is untrue. It is for the parties to decide whether they wish to be bound and, if so, by what terms, whether important or unimportant. It is the parties who are, in the memorable phrase coined by the Judge, “the masters of their contractual fate”. Of course the more important the term is the less likely it is that the parties will have left it for future decision. But there is no legal obstacle which stands in the way of the parties agreeing to be bound now while deferring important matters to be agreed later.

本案的情况，Lloyd勋爵认为买家的行为符合其中第（4）及（6）的原则，那么尚待商定的条款具有经济意义的事实并不妨碍合同即刻生效，从而判买家关于合同并未缔结的上诉不成立。

而前头提到的两个案“Subject to contract”及“Subject to details”等变体的情况，可以归于Lloyd勋爵所说的第（2）及（3）点所说的情况，即各方已经就拟议合同的所有条款达成一致，但他们可能打算在达成一些进一步的条件或条款之前，合同不具有约束力；也就是说合同并未最终缔结。

回头来看文章开头所说的“根据英国法，合同是严格的，只有每一个细节都谈拢了，合同才算有效或立。如合同的细节没有谈拢，合同就没有成立。此外，英国法还强调，在谈定条款时，双方必须有受合同约束的意图。”这段话，显然实际情况并非如此。判断一合约是否已经成立，不可以在某个特定的时间上划一界限，然后来判断成立与否；而应该看谈判过程中，前前后后所发生的一切整体来判断。如之前提到到Hussey v. Horne-Payne, (1879) 4 App. Cas. 311案，Cairns法官所说。

Hussey v. Horne-Payne案，也被高等法院的Cooke法官在Cable and Wireless Plc & Anor v Valentine & Ors [2005] EWHC 409 (Comm) (16 March 2005)案中引援：

I was referred to a number of decisions including Hussey v. Horne-Payne (1879) 4 App. Cas. 311, Love & Stewart Ltd v S. Instone & Co. Ltd (1917) 33 T.L.R 475, Trollope & Colls Ltd v Atomic Power Constructions Ltd [1962] 3 All ER 1035 and Pagnan S.p.A. v Feed Products Ltd [1987] 2 LLR 601. These decisions make it plain that it is possible for documents, on their face, to appear to represent a concluded agreement but that there can be other elements which remain unagreed which the parties accept as essential for agreement before any binding contract is concluded. Thus Lord Selborne in Hussey (ibid) at page 323: –

“It appears to me that no such contract ought to be held established, even by letters which would otherwise be sufficient for the purpose, if it is clear, upon the facts, that there were other conditions of the intended contract, beyond and besides those expressed in the letters, which were still in a state of negotiation only, and without the settlement of which the parties had no idea of concluding any agreement.”

在Clydesdale Bank Plc v Duffy [2014] EWCA Civ 1260 (29 January 2014)案中，上诉院的Lewison勋爵在其第12段判决中说到：这只是对既定原则的反映，为了决定在一系列来文中是否达成了具有约束力的协议，法院必须审视整个系列，而不是停留在所谓的协议之日。

12. As Mr MacDonald pointed out in his skeleton argument, this is simply a reflection of the well established principle that in order to decide whether a binding agreement has been reached in the course of a series of communications the court must look at the whole series and not stop the clock at the date of the alleged agreement. See Hussey v Horne-Payne [1878] 4 Appeal Cases 311.

又如在Global Asset Capital, Inc & Anor v Aabar Block S.A.R.L. & Ors [2017] EWCA Civ 37 (01 February 2017) 案中，上诉院的Hamblen勋爵在其第28段到31段判决中说到：公认的是，在谈判过程中断定是否签订合同时，法院将审视这些谈判的整个过程。原则上，无论谈判是以书面形式，口头形式还是通过行为或通过这些通信手段的组合进行，Hussey案中的做法和理由都适用。

28.It is well established that when deciding whether a contract has been made during the course of negotiations the court will look at the whole course of those negotiations – see Hussey v. Horne-Payne, (1878) 4 App Cas 311.

As Lord Cairns observed in that case at 316:

“…You must not at one particular time draw a line and say, “We will look at the letters up to this point and find in them a contract or not, but we will look at nothing beyond”. 29.In order fairly to estimate what was arranged and agreed, if anything was agreed between the parties, you must look at the whole of that which took place and passed between them”.

30.The rationale of this approach is that focusing on one part of the parties’ communications in isolation, without regard to the whole course of dealing, can give a misleading impression that the parties had reached agreement when in fact they had not – see Lord Selborne in Hussey at 323.

31.In principle, the approach in Hussey and its rationale apply regardless of whether the negotiations are conducted in writing, orally or by conduct or by a combination of those means of communication.

Hamblen勋爵在第40段判决中说到，要约函是“Subject to contract”，以合同为准，公认的是这样的方式来处理是在否定合同意图。

The Offer Letter was “subject to contract”. It is well established that dealing on such a basis negates contractual intention

在RTS Flexible Systems Ltd v Molkerei Alois Muller Gmbh & Company KG (UK Production) [2010] UKSC 14 (10 March 2010) 案中，最高法院的Clarke勋爵在其第45段到49段判决中说到：一般原则是毫无疑问的。双方是否有约束力的合同，如果有的话，取决于他们所同意的条款。这不取决于他们的主观心态，而是要考虑他们之间通过文字或行为交流的内容，以及这是否客观地得出他们打算建立法律关系，并同意他们所认为的所有条款的结论 或者法律对于形成具有法律约束力的关系是必不可少的。 即使对当事人的经济或其他重要性的某些条款尚未最终确定，客观评价其言词和行为也可能导致这样的结论，即他们不打算同意这些条款是达成和合法的有约束力的协议的先决条件。

45.The general principles are not in doubt. Whether there is a binding contract between the parties and, if so, upon what terms depends upon what they have agreed. It depends not upon their subjective state of mind, but upon a consideration of what was communicated between them by words or conduct, and whether that leads objectively to a conclusion that they intended to create legal relations and had agreed upon all the terms which they regarded or the law requires as essential for the formation of legally binding relations. Even if certain terms of economic or other significance to the parties have not been finalised, an objective appraisal of their words and conduct may lead to the conclusion that they did not intend agreement of such terms to be a pre-condition to a concluded and legally binding agreement.

Clarke勋爵认为，这些原则适用于所有合同，包括销售合同和建筑合同，在Pagnan SPA v Feed Products Ltd [1987]案中已经非常清晰地陈述。在该案中，Clarke勋爵也引援了Lloyd勋爵所归纳的6个观点。

48.These principles apply to all contracts, including both sales contracts and construction contracts, and are clearly stated in Pagnan SPA v Feed Products Ltd [1987] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 601, both by Bingham J at first instance and by the Court of Appeal. In Pagnan it was held that, although certain terms of economic significance to the parties were not agreed, neither party intended agreement of those terms to be a precondition to a concluded agreement. The parties regarded them as relatively minor details which could be sorted out without difficulty once a bargain was struck. The parties agreed to bind themselves to agreed terms, leaving certain subsidiary and legally inessential terms to be decided later.

而在Air Studios (Lyndhurst) Ltd (t/a Air Entertainment Group) v Lombard North Central Plc [2012] EWHC 3162 (QB) (09 November 2012)案中，Males法官在其第6到第8段判决中引援了Clarke法官在RTS Flexible案中的观点。类似的，在Cable and Wireless Plc & Anor v Valentine & Ors [2005] EWHC 409 (Comm) (16 March 2005)案中，高等法院的Cooke法官在其第20到22段判决中也引援了Hussey案及Pagnan案中的观点。

英国作为判例法国家，历经数百年所积淀下来的无数先例，不断地被后来的法官修正完善。但从最近历史看，普通法的合约解释是连续性的而不是变化，英国法律作为商业事宜选择法律制度的一个吸引力在于其稳定性和连续性，特别是在合约解释方面。诚如Hodge勋爵在2017年的Wood v Capita案中所说：

The recent history of the common law of contractual interpretation is one of continuity rather than change. One of the attractions of English law as a legal system of choice in commercial matters is its stability and continuity, particularly in contractual interpretation.

最后以Andrew Smith法官在Bear Stearns Bank Plc v Forum Global Equity Ltd [2007] EWHC 1576 (Comm) (05 July 2007)案中，第171段判决所说的作为本文的结尾：

The proper approach is, I think, to ask how a reasonable man, versed in the business, would have understood the exchanges between the parties. Nor is there any legal reason that the parties should not conclude a contract while intending later to reduce their contract to writing and expecting that the written document should contain more detailed definition of the parties’ commitment than had previously been agreed.

我认为，正确的做法是询问一个理性的，精通业务的人如何理解双方之间的交流。没有任何法律上的理由认为，双方当时不打算签订合同，而是简化他们的书面合同；并期望书面文件应该包含比之前已达成一致的双方承若更详细的定义。